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One of the most vivid pieces of propaganda against Conserva-
tive economic policy appeared on the streets in August 1980. Blaz-
oned across the front page of the mass circulation Daily Record 
were the words: "WANTED: prime minister urgently required to take 
over from failed incumbent. Must care about people, find jobs for 
two million (241,267 in Scotland). Salary £30,430." The mock ad-
vertisement summed up the anger and anguish many Scots felt about 
the massive jump in unemployment since the Conservatives assumed 
office. Squeezing public spending and exposing manufacturing in-
dustry to the full blast of a world recession was bound to drive 
up the number of unemployed in Scotland, well familiar with being 
last with the boom and first with the slump. 
Scotland had little to expect from a Conservative government. 
She showed herself reluctant to tread the path of self-government 
in March 1979 and two months later in the General Election she 
placed her faith in a strong Labour majority at Westminster. The 
story of the next two years is therefore of a Tory-led Scottish 
Office wielding power without the authority bestowed by a Scottish 
majority in the House of Commons, a team professedly unionist and 
anti-interventionist which showed little sign of persuading Scots 
that unemployment was the inevitable result of hard-headed policies 
needed to conquer inflation. 
That,however, is only half the story. For behind this tough, 
sometimes abrasive facade, Scottish Office ministers discovered 
their own invisible hand to pull the levers of the economy. It may 
not have been what Adam Smith or Milton Friedman had imagined, but 
as a form of "constructive interventionism" it helped them to pull 
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off some notable victories and stave off what seemed at first like 
probable defeats. The approach was most visible during the take-
over battle for the Royal Bank of Scotland Group, an issue rightly 
recognised as one of crucial importance for the Scottish economy, 
though the outcome had still to be resolved at the time of writing. 
The arrival of Mrs Thatcher at No 10 Downing Street marked a 
radical departure in political and economic thinking. Underlying 
her preoccupation with monetary targets and small-shop-on-the-corner 
talk of "not spending money you have not earned" was a deep scepti-
cism about the power of governments to change or improve things in 
a democracy. Government was neither omniscient nor omnipotent and 
there was a limit to what the people should expect of their rulers. 
The burden was placed on the people themselves: the task of the 
UK workforce was to cut their expectations, the challenge to im-
prove productivity. 
In Scotland Conservative economic policy differed in style and 
philosophy from that of their predecessors. In speech after speech 
ministers spelt out the same message: Scotland was part of the UK 
economy which was undergoing a structural change and it was not the 
Government's job to hinder that process by ineffective intervention 
which would only act as a palliative and would cost public money. 
When the going began to get rough and unemployment began to 
soar, the tune barely changed. Indeed so anxious were ministers to 
get the message across that two identical speeches were given with-
in the space of a few days by Messrs. Fletcher and Younger to pub-
lic and private sector leaders. It was, as The Scotsman observed, 
a case of "The speech now going on all platforms." The change in 
style was the natural result of the change in philosophy. Mr Younger 
steered clear of meetings with trade unions, management, local 
councillors and local MPs which Labour used to see as a necessary 
show of sympathy at such times. After each big closure the Scottish 
Office press office would send a short expression of regret coupled 
with the explanation that it was a "commercial decision." 
There were obvious pitfalls in such an approach. At worst it 
could be attacked as a sign of insensitivity and lack of concern 
towards those suffering the distress of losing their jobs; at 
best it could be seen as a rather lame excuse for inaction. Sooner 
or later questions were going to be asked about what George Younger 
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and Alex Fletcher were doing to fight Scotland's corner at Whi 
If the answers were unsatisfactory then both Labour and the SNP 
would have plenty of ammunition in store for the next General Elec-
tion. 
The Govern~ent 1 s natural supporters in Scotland were not slow 
to remind them of this. Mr Robin Duthie, Mr Fletcher's choice for 
the vacant post of chairman of the Scottish Development Agency, 
ruffled plenty of feathers when he accused Londoners of 
what was happening north of Watford. He said people in the South 
East of England had no idea how serious the problem of unemployment 
was in places like the West of Scotland. And, making a point peri-
lously close to heresy, he said he doubted the wisdom of closing 
down capacity at the cost of so many jobs. 
For George Younger and Alex Fletcher the difficulty lay not 
only in having to bend the ears of instinctive anti-interventionists 
such as Sir Keith Joseph. They were also well aware that their own 
parish was, at least initially, more vulnerable than most to the 
effects of a recession and strict monetary policies which cut the 
amount of money for regional aid. The sheer size of the labour-
intensive manufacturing sector in Scotland meant that a labour 
shake-out would have a horrific impact o~ the number of people out 
of work. 
The problem was compounded by the traditional reliance on 
overseas manufacturing companies for providing jobs. In 1980 one 
estimate put the number of jobs at 100,000 jobs or 16 per cent of 
the workforce. During a slump foreign companies have a habit of 
retrenching abroad before slimming down at home and this was exact-
ly what happened in Scotland in the first two years of Conservative 
rule. When Singer closed down their plant at Clydebank 4500 jobs 
went at a stroke. The list of foreign or foreign-owned companies 
shutting down seemed endless: Monsanto in Ayrshire, Pye TMC at 
Livingston, Wiggins Teape at Corpach, VF Corporation at Greenock, 
Massey Ferguson at Kilmarnock. The worrying thing was the number 
of jobs lost; these were not small factories, they employed hun-
dreds of people. 
There were question marks too about Scotland's dependence on 
foreign investment. In the Seventies American companies shed 40,000 
jobs and the number of incoming companies providing labour nowhere 
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nearly matched that number. The redundancies and factory closures 
seemed to be a brutal testimony to the way Scotland had become a 
branch factory economy with little or no control over her own 
future. As Ray Perman of the Financial Times put it: "One of the 
dangers now facing Scotla~d is that the new industries coming to 
replace the old will be in the same positio~ in 10 or 20 years time 
and today's bright hopes on the frontiers of technology will be 
to~orrow 1 s peripheral plants with high overheads to be closed when 
world capacity has to be cut back."(l) Such thoughts did not pre-
vent the Government from launching a big drive to bring more in-
ward investment to Scotland. Nor did it prevent one of the fiercest 
battles being fought with the Scottish Development Agency over con-
trol of this function, though the controversy was also used as an 
excuse for bringing the SDA, a Labour creation, under a tighter 
rein. 
a 
After the failure to attract the US electronics company Mostek, 
report by a group of management consultants highlighted Scotland's 
fragmented industrial promotion effort. Though it was 
the SDA, it had the effect of galvanising Mr Fletcher, 
prepared for 
never a 
great believer in the Agency's promotion role abroad,which he felt 
was too much like a haggis and bagpipes brigade. Fletcher's line 
was that the Foreign Office consular staff were well equipped to 
deal with industrial promotion and there was no sense in duplica-
ting the role. Once again Robin Duthie failed to see eye to eye 
with his former sponsor. Scotland, he said was an entirely separate 
entity and had to be marketed as such. Duthie further blotted his 
copy book by publicising his victory in keeping open the overseas 
offices of the SDA when he gave evidence to the Scottish Select 
Committee on that same subject. 
The result was a messy compromise. Firstly, the Select Comm-
ittee split on party lines on the question of the overseas role of 
the SDA. The Conservatives said they should pull out and should 
close their offices in the United States and Europe; Labour res-
ponded by producing a minority report defending the SDA. A more 
united approach might have been possible had it not been for an-
other outspoken outburst from Duthie who likened monetarism to a 
"blunt instrument." That scuppered any chances of a joint approach 
and made the Tories even more disaffected with Duthie. In fact, 
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fletcher had decided to go his own way before the final report was , 
published and in March this year he announced that he intended to 
set up a "Locate in Scotland" investment bureau. This was the "one 
door" approach to inward investment which merged the responsible 
departments in the SDA and the Scottish Economic Planning Department.
It marked a victory for the Civil Service. 
The new team was to be led by Dick Burns, a senior civil ser-
vant and he made his presence felt when the Japanese car giant Niss-
an indicated they were looking to set up a car plant in the UK. Lo-
cal authority planners were invited to a meeting in Glasgow for 
what they thought would be a discussion on how best to present their 
individual cases. It turned out to be a diktat - Dick Burns and his 
men had already decided on four sites to offer the Japanese. The 
notion of bringing a car plant to Scotland in the wake of the Lin-
wood closure was a non-starter,but the occasion provided a useful 
guide to the way the SDA were being elbowed out and how the Civil 
Service intended to take control. 
But the Conservatives'relationship with the SDA grew a little 
better with time. After the initial boardroom bloodletting, the 
dismissal of Sir William Gray, then chairman, and the resignation 
of Lewis Robertson, chief executive, the Agency had an easier ride 
than its counterpart in the South, the National Enterprise Board. 
True, its budget was trimmed from £700 million to £500 million and 
its investment wings were clipped in December 1979. The new· guide-
lines stated that loans or shares over £1 million had to be referred 
to the Secretary of State for approval, but that was hardly a bold 
move since the limit under Labour was only £2 million. 
Fletcher saw a different role for the SDA. If it had been a 
virility symbol for "regeneration" under Labour, the Tories want-
ed a blend of joint ventures with financial institutions and pri-
vate capital. Fletcher's specific idea was to set up a new invest-
ment bank,but the Scottish clearers were far from enthusiastic. 
Plan B was that they should participate in a new holding company 
for Agency investment but again private money was slow to appear. 
The role of the SDA in the rescue of the Weir Group, Scotland's 
largest engineering group, was a more successful story and it high-
lighted the constructive interventionism alluded to earlier. Weir 
is based only a short distance from the Linwood car plant and if 
172 
it had gone under the storm may well have lasted until the next 
election. In many ways Weir was Scotland's ICL, the main difference 
being that it did not need a newspaper campaign to point out that 
there was little sense in allowing a good company with good products 
to go to the wall in the name of free market economics. 
The group began to skid out of control early in 1980 when the 
core of its business, the pumps side, fell wildly behind budget. 
Within a few months the company was forced to shed 1000 employees 
and was reporting huge losses. More seriously, the chairman, Lord 
Weir, had expressed confidence in his annual statement only months 
earlier that there would be a recovery sometime in 1980. By Sept-
ember 1980 the group was forced to put together temporary bridging 
arrangements with its banks and the Finance Corporation for Indus-
try, which had made a loan of £11 million some years earlier. It 
was clear to Alex Fletcher, who had been warned earlier in the year 
that the group was in deep trouble, that survival would depend on 
the banks' willingness to defer payment on some of their debt. 
The solution was for Weir's overdraft to be converted into new 
preference shares and the signs are that Fletcher, aided by the new 
chief executive of the Scottish Development Agency George Matthew-
son, twisted a few arms in banking circles to ensure that they did 
not pull the plug on the business by insisting on repayment. Scott-
ish institutions were less keen on becoming drawn into the Weir 
deal when it came to the floating of the preference shares; the 
new chairman Sir Francis Tombs (part of the deal was that Lord Weir 
would step down) said he was disappointed that there had been a 
lack of enthusiasm for the shares. In fact they were snapped up 
weeks later by an American private investor Derald Ruttenberg. 
Despite the success of the rescue, there was a feeling that Scots 
may have missed out on an opportunity to show their commitment to 
an important company still based in Scotland. 
Another important company to benefit from the backroom manoeuv-
ering of Scottish Office ministers was Ferranti. Ferranti employ 
well over 7000 workers in 10 Scottish plants in high technology 
and precision engineering, exactly the activities which were id-
entified by the Conservatives as the key to Scotland's economic 
future. Its contribution to the group's total turnover in 1979 was 
40 per cent; no mean achievement. When Ferranti ran into trouble 
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in the mid Seventies Labour called in the National Enterprise Board 
and asked them to take up a 50 per cent holding in the group. Under 
the new Tory regime private capital was supposed to do the job and 
so Sir Keith Joseph ordered the sale of the ~~B holding, the ar-
gument being that Ferranti no longer needed NEB crutches and should 
be prepared to stand on its own two feet. 
Sir Keith's move badly miscalculated the initial effect it 
would have on public opinion in Scotland where people were less im-
pressed with "sale of the century" rhetoric. They feared that sale 
of a majority shareholding would leave Ferranti vulnerable to a 
takeover. The giant electronics firms GEC and Racal were prime pre-
dators. A takeover could mean that the parent company would seek 
to rationalise in Scotland where business was duplicated. At the 
very least, as Peter Balfour, chairman of the Scottish Council, 
argued, there was room for concern about the possible effect on 
future growth of Ferranti's manufacturing plants north of the Bor-
der. Alex Fletcher's invisible hand went to work. He knew he could 
use the Labour Party and the Scottish TUC as an "advance guard" to 
stake out a position calling for no sale of shares; he also knew 
he could block the sale of a controlling stake provided he could 
come up with a compromise solution which would open up the share-
holding while protecting Ferranti's independence. 
After several weeks of intensive lobbying at Westminster and 
wooing the financial institutions in Edinburgh, Fletcher was able 
to argue that Scots would not stand for a takeover by either of 
the two electronic giants. He also had the support of George 
Younger who argued that the interests of the company (who were 
against a takeover)had to be considered as well as the interests 
of the taxpayer (whose NEB stake had risen substantially in value). 
Having bent Sir Keith's ear,Fletcher was able to come up with his 
compromise solution: the NEB should place their 50 per cent hold-
ing with financial institutions rather than to the highest bidder 
on the open market and the institutions should not be allowed to 
sell their holding for two years without the permission of the NEB. 
This was the "covenant solution" and Sir Keith reluctantly agreed 
to it. 
The significance of the Ferranti battle was that it showed 
that the Scottish Office were not prepared to let a good company 
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fall into the hands of a competitor in deference to the free play 
of the market. When it came to the crunch Fletcher and his colleag-
ues were unwilling to trust the market or the Monopolies Commission 
to safeguard the interests of Ferranti; they were even prepared 
to set a dangerous precedent by nominally restricting investment 
managers' freedom to sell shares when they wished- hardly the 
one would normally associate with Conservative rhetoric. 
behaviour ----
The response from Scottish institutions was disappointing. They 
took a dim view of the 530p price tag and it was later reported 
that they had taken only 20 per cent of the 50 per cent NEB stake. 
This pulled the carpet from under Fletcher's argument that the in-
stitutions were queuing up to get their hands on shares. He later 
said the delay in making a move on the market was an example of 
"Scottish canniness" or a desire to pick them up at the best 
price. He failed to mention that he had to jolly some of them along 
to do just that. Sir Arthur Knight, then chairman of the NEB, said 
the institutions had not been as enthusiastic as expected given 
the strong political campaign in Scotland. That may have been a 
tacit admission that Fletcher had succeeded with a hand which was 
not half as strong as it had first appeared to be. 
Ferranti were not the only company threatened by predators out-
side Scotland. The publishing house Collins successfully fought 
off a bid by Rupert Murdoch's News International after a bitter 
struggle.Also in Glasgow an even bloodier boardroom battle was 
fought out between Mr Tiny Rowland of Lonrho and House of Fraser 
the department store group. Sir Hugh Fraser, then chairman, spent 
months slinging mud at Mr Rowland until they met secretly in an 
Ayrshire hotel and were suddenly the best of friends again. The 
Fraser board were not impressed; Sir Hugh was ousted as chairman 
and the bid went to the Monopolies Commission. It was not the 
first time the Commission were called in to examine whether a 
sound Scottish company should merge with or be submerged by an 
ambitious suitor with plenty of money in his wallet. 
Two companies eager for a match who had more money than most 
were the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,and the Stan-
dard Chartered Bank. Their bids for the Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group, which contained the largest and only wholly independent 
bank in scotland, illustrated more than anything else how diffi-
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cult it was to retain a strong indigenous base in the Scottish 
anomy. For Alex Fletcher the proposed takeover was crucial. 
consistently argued that he was in favour of Scots managing 
own businesses. He was well aware of the role that 
in "fixing" or smoothing out hiccups in companies like the Weir 
Group, he knew the impor~ance of banks in lending venture capital 
for small ambitious companies, the very sort he and other Tories 
had sought to promote since coming to power. One of his favourite 
equations for the rejuvenation of the Scottish economy was elec-
tronics plus oil plus banks equals future success. 
Fletcher was reportedly horrified when he opened his copy of 
the Financial Times and read that the Royal Bank of Scotland were 
holding merger talks with Standard Chartered, a UK registered bank 
with considerable interests in the Middle East and South Africa, 
but no foothold in the UK market. He was also distinctly 
with the price on offer - a little over £300 million pounds plus 
eight directors on the Standard Chartered Board. The scene was set 
for the reactivation of the Scottish lobby which had worked so 
effectively during the Ferranti battle. Fletcher made some infor-
mal contacts with members of the Scottish financial institutions 
and found that they too felt strongly about the Royal Bank diving 
into bed with another bank, particularly one which was likely to 
remove control to London. And so a lobby was born. Peter de Vink, 
aided and abetted by Ian Noble, both successful financiers, began 
to enlist support in Edinburgh and Glasgow for a campaign to block 
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the merger. Meanwhile the invisible hand went to work at Westminster. 
Fletcher approached Scottish Tory backbenchers and asked them 
for their views. Most had failed to give the matter much thought at 
this stage, though they were uneasy about control of the proposed 
new UK bank (the so-called fifth force alongside Nat West, Barclays, 
Lloyds and Midland) being removed to London. They were also wary 
of following the Labour Party and the SNP, both of whom had cried 
"wolf" as soon as the merger terms were announced. But Fletcher's 
most important move was to approach the newly installed Trade 
Secretary John Biffen who had been a regular attender of the 
Scottish Conservative backbench meetings during the run-up to de-
volution and had a good idea of the importance of keeping the 
Scots sweet. Biffen turned out to be sympathetic. This was import-
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ant since as Trade Secretary he had the ultimate responsibility 
deciding whether to refer the Standard Chartered bid to the for 
Monopolies Commission. 
The difficulty for Fletcher was how to draw up a convincing 
case for referral. It was to say the least 
lies Commission to be called in when there 
unusual for the Monopo-
was no danger of a mono-
poly being created and when both parties endorsed the terms of the 
deal. The line he took, with the support of George Younger, was to 
argue in terms of public interest. An independent Scottish bank was 
an important asset to the Scottish economy and to remove control 
south could jeopardise jobs and new businesses north of the Border. 
Whether that line would have stood up to examination is uncertain. 
There were question marks over the Royal Bank's ability to compete 
in the big league and prospects for future growth were bleak un-
less the bank hitched up with a bigger partner. There may have 
been a case for changing the terms 
the case for blocking it altogether 
ish emotion. 
of the marriage contract but 
seemed too charged with Scott-
That impression grew stronger when The Scotsman revealed that 
a small group of financiers, including De Vink and Noble, had 
suggested a completely different deal to the Royal Bank and, in-
deed, to the Bank of England. They proposed hiving off the Royal 
Bank's wholly owned subsidiary Williams and Glyns and selling it 
to Standard Chartered in return for a shareholding in Standard. 
The Royal, revitalised with Scottish blood, would then take the 
plunge overseas and everyone would live happily ever after. The 
Royal Bank board sat tight and said not one word, not even confirm-
ing that they had received such a proposal. 
At the time it might have seemed the right thing to do. The 
Royal had been looking for a partner since October 1979 and had 
considered several banks. Standard Chartered was the perfect fit, 
according to Sir Michael Herries, because it allowed the Royal to 
plug into Standard's overseas network and allowed Standard to get 
into the UK where there was plenty of potential deposit money to 
mop up. Privately, he is said to have been baffled at what all the 
fuss in Scotland was about. 
He soon found out. Soon after the merger talks between the 
Royal and Standard had been announced, a new suitor arrived on the 
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scene. The suitor was big, very big, and came all the way from 
Kong. The day after almost doubling Standard's original offer, a 
group of executives from the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Cor-
poration stepped out of a Rolls Royce in St Andrew Square and 
completely upstaged Standard by giving specific assurances on 
Scottish autonomy if and when a merger should take place. They 
also neatly trumped Standard by promising that the 
be the "flagship" of a new European operation. 
The entry of the Hong Kong dragon and the subsequent matching 
of their offer by Standard Chartered ensured that both bids went to 
the Monopolies Commission. Though the Office of Fair Trading were 
uneasy about handling the bids because there was no clear monopoly, 
Biffen was able to argue that a referral was in the public 
He also let it be known that he had taken into account the impor-
tance of Edinburgh as a financial centre and the importance of a 
strong Scottish banking system. Once again the market had not been 
allowed free play: two giant banks had not been obliged to slug 
it out in public and Mr Fletcher had succeeded in pushing for some 
recognition that there was such a thing as Scottish public interest. 
The question to be settled by the Monopolies Commission was 
whether the drive for a City-based UK-managed fifth force in Bri-
tish banking- the offspring of the Royal's marriage with Standard 
Chartered - should overweigh the Scottish case for retaining and de-
veloping Edinburgh as a healthy alternative to London. The outcome 
of the battle for the Royal Bank was also seen as likely to affect 
the future of Scotland's other major bank, the Bank of Scotland, 
currently 35 per cent owned by Barclays Bank. Once the door was 
opened into Scotland it could only be a matter of time before more 
hungry predators came sniffing around for a chance to snap up the 
Bank of Scotland. 
But how Scottish is the Royal Bank and was there any point in 
arguing in terms of Scottish public interest? The majority of Royal 
Bank shares are said to be held outside Scotland, indeed the two 
biggest shareholders are Lloyds (16 per cent) and the Kuwait In-
vestment Office (around seven per cent). One of the headlines ran 
"Scotland's banking future up for auction." Well, yes, but was 
this not one more lament at the death of devolution and a refusal 
to admit that the wheels of control were in fact revolving in the 
178 
south. When Michael Sandberg, chairman of the Hong Kong bank flew 
to Edinburgh to meet the top executives of the Scottish financial 
institutions he found that many of them were attending meetings in 
London for the week. 
For many Scots,the Royal Bank takeover bids raised some un-
pleasant questions. For the ordinary deposit holder it meant that 
the bank on the corner might suddenly change its name and its notes; 
for the businessman in Scotland it meant that the all-important in-
formal contacts might be lost; for some of the members of the 
Royal Bank board it meant that issues they had argued for passion-
ately in the past quietly took a back seat. 
Peter Balfour, vice chairman of the Royal Bank, was also chair-
man of Scottish and Newcastle breweries and chairman of the Scottish 
Council which consistently complained about the stampede of decision 
makers to London from Scotland. Robin Duthie, the man who had de-
livered the "north of Watford" speech only months earlier had en-
dorsed the deal with Standard. Nowhere was there any sign in the 
original deal announced in London that these two powerful men had 
extracted some copper-bottomed guarantees for Scottish autonomy or 
even seen it as necessary to do so. 
The takeover battle also illustrated how difficult it was to 
organise a Scottish financial lobby to put forward a strong public 
case for autonomy; instead it was left to the "outs" like De Vink 
and Noble. The "ins" who were prominent in Scotland's commercial 
and semi-political life were often either on the Royal Bank board 
or knew them very well. Balfour, Duthie and Max Harper-Gow, all 
Royal board members held numerous other directorships; Sir 
Michael Herries, chairman, became chairman of Scottish Widows Fund 
and Life Assurance during the takeover battle. Many others felt 
there was a clear clash between personal friendship and profession-
al instinct and so chose to remain silent. With one or two not-
able exceptions such as Lord Clydesmuir, the retiring governor of 
the Bank of Scotland, many felt that it was not worth speaking out 
for something as ill-defined and intangible as the Scottish public 
interest. 
It was a response characteristic of two years of Conservative 
rule, two years marked by a sense of impotence as workers fought 
for higher severance pay rather than the preservation of their jobs. 
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In Conservative vocabulary that was the New Realism, the spirit of 
change required for revival. But hope for the future rests on a 
measure of control being retained north of the Border and this was 
recognised by the Conservatives when and where they practised their 
constructive interventionism. So, despite the anti-interventionist 
and one nation rhetoric, Scottish Office ministers were well aware 
of the need to fight Scotland's corner at Whitehall. Scotland con-
tinued to be marketed as a separate entity, even if the Scottish 
Development Agency was forced to relinquish some of its influence 
to the Civil Service. While it is true that the Conservatives allow-
ed the recession to take its toll of companies north of th·~ Border, 
they nevertheless selected carefully the issues over which to fight. 
When Ferranti was threatened,a political campaign was organised to 
secure its independence. The Monopolies Commission, the official 
body entrusted to watch over such matters, was ignored. And yet, 
during the Royal Bank takeover battle the Commission was used as 
an instrument temporarily to block two ~ids neither of which con-
stituted a potential monopoly. The guardian of the public interest 
had suddenly become the guardian of the Scottish public interest. 
It was the supreme example of the triumph of politics over rhetoric. 
There was indeed more than an invisible hand at work in the Scottish 
economy at mid term. 
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